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U.S. v . Glaxo Group Ltd. 
Appeal from USDC DC: Gasch 
This is a direct appeal from an anit-trust action. The 
govt brings the appeal under the expediting act. 
XNN Two British companies, Galaxo and Imperial Chemical 
Industries, Lta . txg~~xtx«i (ICI) owned a number of patents 
relating to the maNNga« manufacture and use of gxi~ griseofulvin, w 
an antibotic drug . xk~x~ax They agreed with each other to pool 
; heir patf¼}s an~(c, prohibit licensees from selling griseDfulvin 
in bulk form . Accoridingly, ICI entered R into an agreement with 
its licensee , American Home FxNNN«g Products Corpx and Galxo 
entered into agreements with Schering Corp and XNRNXW Johnson & 
Johnson ximix±Rgxxax Rx authorizing manufacture of gx ±x Rf griseofulvin 
but XRXKXX«XiRgxxxaxxaXRXXKX prohibiting sales in bulk . 






violating §1 of the Sherman Act . The complaint «N alleged that 
the two comr:f\,1ies had combined to res#t sales of ix their 
licensees. The case was decided without trial on the discovery 
that was taken. The district court held that the restriction 
against selling griseofulvini in bulk form was a violation. 
complained 
The government also xxxe~XXNXameN~Xxkex~EM~XXXNXXXEXKNEW that 
the griseofulvin patents owned by ICI and Glaxo were invalide. 
But the two defendants stated that they were not relying on 
the validity of the patents. JkexgNXRXNMRNXXKNRXRX~XRXXMXRN 
The court therefore ruled that the government had no standing 
to challenge the patents, and it struck those allegations of 
XNXX invalidity from the complaint. Nor would the court permit 
the government to ammend the complaint to show, aside from the 
anti~t claim, that the patents were illegal. The govt sought 
a decree prohibiting any bul~ sale restrictions and requiring 
compulsory sales Nf and licensing provisions. The court refused 
to grant the latter relief noting that the licensing conduct 
was not bound up with the illegal RK restrictions on bulk sales. 
On appeal, the govt contends that the disrict court erred -
in not considering the validity of the patent and that it should 
have required compulsory licensing. In United States v. American 
Bell Telephone, ~o., xx2xNxixxx~ix 167 U.S. 224 (1897), the Court 
decided that the govt did not have standing to ~kx challenge the 
validity of a patent excpet on grounds of fraud or deceit. However , 
in U.S. V. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948), when 
an anti-trust def raised a patent as a defnese, the govt was 
permitted to show that the patent was invalid. The govt claims I that Qypsum ~i«x has overruled Bell and that the public interest 
in free competition should permit it to challenge the validity 





of a patent when it is part of an antitrust scheme • Here the 
patent was the means by which ICI and Glaxo agred and the means -by which they imposed that agreement on their x±e licensees. 
I 
The district court found that the mere involvement of a 
patent was not enough. It limited the holding in Qy.I2fil:!ffiR ~ 
cases where the validity of the patent was an essential part of 
the antitrust litigation. I tend to think that the court was 
correct in so ruling. There is a good reason to keep the Justice 
Dept from going into court challenging the decisions of the 
Patent Office to grant patents. And since every patent is a 
restraint of trade, the g~ Justice Dept will be able to do that 
unless the rule in Gypsum is limited. 
The government's second contention is that the district 
court should have g compelled the two defs to x±~exRx±ex license 
or sell to anyone who wantee to EN~ buy the drug. It claims 
that the this is essential to effective relief because the 
restrictions on the bulk sale of griseofulvin have rlulted in 
~ 
very few companies that deal in the good in bulk. Only unlimited 
licensing will remedy that market defect. The district court 
is XXN said to have erred in ruling that the evidence did not 
>mN show that compulsive licensing was required. Re Apellees 
point out, however, that the district court is generally given 
a good deal of discretion in fashioning relief. 
Appellees raise an independent claim about appellant's first 
point, the validity of the patent. They claim that the govt 
has no right to challenge patent validity on direct appeal, 
that the extraditing statute does not xakexR include patent 
cases. This seems to be wrong; surely the govt could appeal 
the validity of a patent if it were, as is claimed here, an essential 
part of its aRKXKN antitrust case. 






There seems to be little precedent in this area, and I 
n 
know so little about it that I do not trust my insticts fully . 
~ 
But I am reasonably sure that the govt's second claim is not 
worth considering. The district court did not deny that it 
had the power to order compulsory licensing ; it said that the 
evidence did not mrxa warrant it . Remedies are xegxx pretty 
XIMX« much XNNX left within the distA}t court's discretion, 
I and 
the 
a rev~ by this Court would require JraN2X wading through 
predictable innumerable documents . As to the validity of 
the patent question, I sense that appelles are right and that 
the judgment below should be affirmed . But I hesitate to make 
a firm recommendation. You may well think that the issue is 
worthy of argument • 
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Two British companies, owning patents on an antibiotic drug, 
agreed with each other (i) to pool their patents and (ii) to prohibit 
licensees from selling in bulk . Each of the British companies then designated 
licensees in the U.S. , under agreements prohibiting bulk sales . 
D.C. 
In an antitrust suit by the government (tried w© ut jury) the 
I':") L 
helWhe agreement violated Section 1 of Sherman Act, but refused to -
consider validity of the patent (as requested by Government). Normally 
Govt. has no standing to challenge validity of a patent under antitrust 
laws. (Patents are intended to create monopolies) , unless an antitrust 
defendant invokes a patent as a defense. U.S. v . United States Gypsum Co . 
District Court construed Gypsum as applying only where validity of patent 
is an essential part o f the antitrust litigation - which was not found to 
ex ist here. 
Govt. also says D.C. e~ ed in not compelling defendants to license 
or sell to anyone who wish to buy the drug . D. C. recognized that it has 
the power to order compulsory licensing, but concluded evidence in case 
did not warrant it . 
I~ no law requiring compulsory licensj.ng in the absence 






Tentative View: Affirm decision of D.C. We are unlikely ever 





._,.,{ v/, ~ /7 -Y 
Court USDC , D. C . Voted on .......... . ....... , 19 .. . 
Argued .. ................. , 19 . . . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No. 71- 666 
Submitted .. . ...... . ...... , 19 . . . Announced ......... ....... , 19 .. . 
UNITED STA TES, Appellant 
vs. 
GLAXO GROUP LIMITED, ET AL. 
I I /I 5/71 Appeal fil e d. ~ ~ ~ - 9---




FOR CERT. STATEMENT MERITS MOTION AB- OT-
HOLD JURISDICTIONAL I NOT 
O D N POST DIS AFF REV AFF G D SENT :NG 
Rehnquist, J ... . ... . ..... , .... . 
Powell, J ................ , .... . 
Blackmun, J . .. ... ...... . , .... . 
Marshall, J . ............ . , .... . 
White, J ........... . .... . , .... . 
Stewart, J . .. . ........... , .... . 
Brennan, J .............. . , .... . 
Douglas, J . ............... , . ... . 
Burger, Ch. J . .... . ...... , .... . 
•J••·· .. ·••1>✓•·••1••••1• 
•I••• •I• • •l-o •••I•••• 
l •• •I •✓• 
·1 · ••. r .. ••I••,• 1 • • • ., .... ,.. V ., .... 
••••I••• 
.... ,.✓ . 
.... ,.✓ 
····1·.✓.· 
.... ,.✓ .. 
✓ •••· •I•••• ... 
. . . ·1 · .. · 1· .. ' I( . ·t.~·~;:.il, ... . ✓.. . . . .. . . . ! -:r~: -~ . JJ. ... 
-
,~ ~ ~ -z-, 
~~ ~ •~ ~-I~ 
---,,,0 ~ ~ 1~ 1""7.-r -r ~ ~~ 
j.., ~=t · s · n Jc PJJ,.,_,__ 
~ (1> ') s. . :s . )'1 ~ >.. >.. ) ~
\. ~~ 
-~ --,.,-¢.,fl ~~ • ~ ~ 
. -:A ~ t: +~r CJ ~;s .-,. -i> 
~~~ Gj-~ °? 
~~~~::>€]~ 
r-rD ~ )-o I-~ ~ 
~ -rv ~ -ry;> ~ ~ ~ 
::>fl -~ ~ ~ 
~ ~~ ~ h, G-f ~ 
~ ~ ~ 'Y'-6? ~ 
~ ~J~~ (. vt)~& o-M__L 
~ ~_J -:>-J~ ~ ~  
c~s)-~---
171 lo ITT n~n~ .. n-T OXV'l9 .A S::il.LV.LS CT::il.LINil 999-IL ·oN 
' . ~ 
j::ir"VV--t.--,r 
~/ f ~ ~ 'rYH CJr}-~
~ ~1--o ~ ~ ~ ~ >-~ 
~~~oro ~ .; ~ ·l \ 
(Ji+,-z. · s· n L"'/f) 
, -pr_J__ ~ ,rY<-4 ~· ~ J-(;/ 
-~':1-1-~r"P~~~Yb 
--~4J-.. 
~ ~ 0-t-~ ~~ ~ 
~~--vvi~~~+t 
·~_L/-ll h~ 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
,rn~ ~ ~ ~ r  ~ 
 ' ~-z-.. 
r~ ~~ ~J-M~ :zr, ~ 
~~~_[-~ 
~2/ ~~~?rr~ ~µ 
~  ~ -/-~-~-
~ ~ .~ ~ ~s: --
( h~ r +£ z-. ~ ~ r) A~~~~...--. ~ ~ 
~ ~ ('~ ~ ~ 





' rn-o Oj ~ ~ 
~ 
1 
',51'1? ~ ~ Orj ~~v 
rvnp-~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -+~ 0-/ ~ 
·r:~ 0-J. ~I/ 
~(~~4)~~ 
 ~ yyv,7 -
. ~ ·~ p ~  
~ ~ Oy o-r?-~~ 
-~~ ~ }-V\ I - ,, . • ')/I // 
~ ~~ ~ 
 -~ 
~~ ~-~ ~ ~ 
.-~~ 
·~ -'-/-V ~ ~  
~ ~--~~ ~ µ ~0-,. 
~yr~ -p -16 . ~
---- -. }--rn ~ ~½ ~ ---z-,a....rn -(J .. u v .__,, -
s./4 L ~ ~ ~ ~ 
-~~ ~ -~ orap 
-~ ~ )-o 
~,;::;;;:.~~~~~ 





OJ~~ ~ ~___, --1-~ 
~ ~ ~-5" L ~ ~ ~ 
' ~ ~ ~ 
~ ~ -~ ~ yry . 51 b--,;, 
~ ~~~ "rYJ4 ~~ -r-j /"VYY/ 
. ~r~~~~ 
. ( 'o~ _/'A-,?/ 
~L ~ -J~o-)~~~~~ 
~~~~~ ... pry;_ ~-;r -
~ ~ ~d ~ ~ 
~ ~ r '-~·-1/+ f,g, ~
~ ~ -t;,~-~~~ ~ 
~ ~  ~ ~ ~-;pcl , ~ 
~ }-o ~ ~~ ~-~ 
~C>/ -Z-.0 ~ ~ _L ~ ~ 
~~~-->'? -~~~~~ 
~~~¾,-A- ~ ~ 
A :X X .X 
· ~-J,,....,_._ L-~ a o 0-/. ,~ -r 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 5.-t~ 
~ ..r?~ ~ . >. 7? / ~ ~ 
~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~._L -~~ 




~ ~ ~ ~~ 
~ J-r, ~ t:7':Yl ~ ~ "iY 
)< X X X 
. ~~ ~ ~ 'fY)-1 4 
·~ (i\--Yv ~ ~ (~~ ~ 
. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
~ ~ ~ r·---r---= s, --:;, -o 
 ~~ --Y)'J~~ ~ -0 
~ ~ -nu 
~s~ Q-Yl.. -~': -_rro ~ Jo L-
~ I<> ~ ~ ~ 
r-7 h -,, ~ ~ ~ --J. ~--
 I ~ \ 
r ~~ f't ~~ -~ ~~ J,-
~· _.., ~~h~ J ~1 '""n.?~ 
~~-~~~~~~~ 
~~(~'i~i>)~ 
. ,I-~ C5>-f ~'->-u 
~ ~  ~0-j> ~~ 






. ~ -1J-t1 ~ --y-y, 
~i-,,._J____,~ ~ 0-f 
~~~~ 
. ~ -u~ _J 
--~~""Y7~~~~ 




-- ~u:prtmt (qourt of tltt ~ittb .jtatts JhtsJrin9hm. l9. <q. 20.;rJ.L.' 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
November 13, -1972 
RE: NO. 71-666, U. S. v. GLAXO GROUP LTD. 
Dear Chief, 
This will confirm that I have asked 
Bill Rehnquist to write the opinion for the Court 
in this case. 
The Chief Justice 







JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
j5u:p-umt (!Jou.rt of t4t 'Jjlttitdt j5tatts 
Jfagfri:ttgton. ~. QJ. 2!l,5J!.~ 
November 22, 1972 
I 
Re: No. 71-666, United States v. Glaxo Group Limited et al. 
Dear Bill, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the Court 
in this case. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 




' \· / 
:41-- / 
.§u:p-umt (!Jltltrt of tqt ~niltb ;i;fattg 
'1'aglrhtgton. J. QJ. 2llffe>l-.;l 
- CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
November 24, 1972 
Re: No. 71-666 - U. S. v. Glaxo Group Ltd. 
Dear Bill: 




Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
✓ 
-
,ju.prtmt <!Jcmrt of t4t ~nitth .$5tntt.a-
'Jlllas-Jr.n-0to~ lB, QJ. 21lffe>!-~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
November 27, 1972 
RE:No. 71-666 -UnitedStatesv. Glaxo 
Group Ltd. 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your dissent in the 
above. 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
/\ -J~ 1/~ . 
✓ 
-
~-/~ ~~d'VV' r~ ~ 
j)u:pTtmt <qqurt qf tlf t 'Jlttmtb ~tatts --
:Was4i:ttghm. ~. <q. :!0-ffe'!-' 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
November 30, 1972 
Re: 71-666 - U. S. v. Glaxo Group Ltd. 
Dear Bill: 
I voted tentatively at Conference to reverse 
in this case largely due to the inadequacy of the remedy 
fashioned by the District Court. I do not intend to write 
but will likely join one or both of the dissents in part. 
Mr. Justi ce Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
·i 
PF ~'j_ •...,_!!. -- ••·•r."P.~ -· ,. _ ~~.,~•-------=----- •-----------------------
-
CHAMBERS OF 
~u.prtmr ~01trt Ltf t4r ';tlnifdt §t,tks 
1l}a.sirittgton, p. <!;. 205>i~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL November 30, 1972 
Re: No. 71-666 - U. S. v. Glaxo Group Ltd. 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me in your dissent. 






- j5u:prtmt QJourt llf tlrt 'Jlinittb j5tattg ~ aglrittghm. ~- QJ. 2!TffeJ!.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
TH E CHIEF JUSTICE 
December 7, 1972 
Re: No. 71-666 - U. S. v. Glaxo Group Ltd . 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
' \ 
/ It appears that the resolution of this case is undeJoing 
som e evolution and t hat Mr. Justice Rehnquist' s proposed 
opinion does not enlist a majority. 
/ 
I was in the "reverse" posture at Confererence and on t1 
reflection Byron White's position comes nearest my view 
of the case. I therefore suggest that he put his hand to 
a draft to see if he can get a Court. 
Mards, 
-
j;n.prnne ~o-nrt of tlre]Jnitth ,§taftg 
~as~ingfo1t. :!). <q. 2.0ffeJ!,J 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS December 22, 1972 
Dear Byron: 
In No. 71-666 - United States v. Glaxo 
Group Ltd., please join me in your opinion. 
w. o. D~ JV 




December 27, 1972 
Re: No. 71-666 United States v. Glaxo 
Dear Byroo: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
- ~upumt <.q:ourt o-f tqc ~ttitth ;§tnitg 1Jllasfringto-n. g). <.q. 20J,Jl-2 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR. December 27, 1972 
RE: No. 71-666 - United States v. Glaxo 
Group Limited et al. 
Dear Byron: 
I agree. 
Mr. Justice White _ 






~uµrcnu (!feud of tltt ~e~ ~ta±es 
'nlail!pn gton, ~. Qf. 2n~,1,~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL January 3, 1973 
Re: No. 71-666 - U. S. v. Glaxo Group Ltd. 
Dear Byron: 
I am still with you. 
Mr. Justice White 
cc: Conference 




CHA MBE RS OF 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
..§u:prtntt QJ~u.d ~f tlft 'Jlinittb ..§taftg 
~rullfmgtm. 10. QJ. 2rrg;:J!., 
January 3, 1973 
Re: No. 71-666 - U. S. v. G laxo Group Ltd. 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me. 
~v~ 
Mr. Justice White 




- CHAMBERS Of" 
~lt}tTtmt {qtmrl of tlf~ 'Jilttililt ~taftg 
jhuiltmgbm. ~. <If. 21l.;i'!-~ 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
January 18, 1973 
Re: No. 71-666 - United States v. Glaxo Group 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Sincerely, 
;u..l 
Mr. Justice Rehnqui st 




JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.§u:p-umt C!fcurt cf tqt ~ttitth .itattg 
~agqmgtcn:. ~. ~ 21Jb,.ll-~ 
January 18, 1973 
71-666 - U. S. v. Glaxo Group 
Dear Bill, 
Please add my name to your dissent-
ing opinion in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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71 - 666 U. $. v. Glaxo Gjroup L t d. 
To : The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. J1.:.stice t:irshal l 
:'~? Jl:stice Blackmun 
~ - Justice Powell 
Mr. J1;stice Rehnquist 
From : White, J . 
1st DRAFT 
Circulated: lc:2. - ;,..1 - 7 Y 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Recircul ated: 
No. 71-666 
United States, Appellant, 
V. 
Glaxo Group Limited et al. 
On Appeal from the United 
States District Court for 
the District of Columbia. 
[January - , 1973] 
MR. J u sTICE vVHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The United States appeals pursuant to § 2 of the 
Expediting Act, 15 U. S. C. § 29, from portions of a 
decision by the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia in a civil antitrust suit. We are 
asked to decide whether the Government may challenge 
the validity of patents involved in illegal restraints of 
trade, when the defendants do not rely upon the patents 
in defense of their conduct, and whether the District 
Court erred in refusing certain relief requested by the 
Government. 
I 
Appellees, Imperial Chemical Industries Liniited (ICI) 
and Glaxo Group Limited ( Glaxo) , are British drug 
companies engaged in the manufacture and sale of 
griseofulvin. Griseofulvin is an antibiotic compound 
which may be cut with inert ingredients and adminis-
tered orally in the form of capsules or tablets to humans 
or animals for the treatment of external fungus infections. 
There is no substitute for dosage-form griseofulvin in 
combating certain infections. Griseofulvin itself is un-
patented and unpatentable. ICI owns various patents 
on the dosage form of the drug.1 Glaxo owns various 
1 Specifically at issue in the present litigation is U. S. Patent 
No. 2,900,204, issued August 18, 1959. The patent embodies two 
~ 




2 UNITED STATES v. GLAXO GROUP LTD. 
patents on a method for manufacturing the drug in bulk 
form. as "·ell as a patent on the finely ground, "microsize" 
dosage form of the drug." 
On April 26, 1960, ICI and Glaxo entered into a formal 
agreement pooling their griseofulvin patents. At the 
time of the execution of the agreement, ICI held patents 
on the dosage form of the drug and Glaxo held bulk-
form manufacturing patents. Pursuant to the agree-
ment, ICI acquired the right to manufacture bulk-form 
griseofulvin under Glaxo's patents. to sell bulk-form 
griseofulvin. and to sublicense under Glaxo's patents. 
Glaxo ,rns authorized to manufacture dosage-form griseo-
fulvin and to sublicense under ICI's patents. As part of 
the agreement . ICI undertook "not to sell and to use its 
best endeavors to prevent its subsidiaries and associates 
from selling any griseofulvin in bulk to any independent 
third party without Glaxo's express consent in ,Hiting." 
Subsequent to the pooling of the griseofulvin patents, 
ICI granted a sublicense to American Home Products 
Corporation (AMHO). ICI's exclusive distributor in the 
l7nited States. ICI agreed to sell bulk-form griseofulvin 
to AMHO. A::\1HO ,ms authorized to process the bulk 
form into dosage form and to sell the drug in that form. 
With respect to bulk sales the agreement stated: "You 
[AMHO] "·ill not, without first obtaining on [ICI's] 
consent. resell. or redeliver in bulk supplies of griseo-
fulvin." Glaxo had previously entered into similar sub-
licensing agreements \Yith t,rn United States companies-
clnim,-(1) a method of curing lrnmun, or animal, of external fungu s 
di,e:·1,e, b\' aclmi ni~tering '"an effecti\·e nmount of gri,eofuh-in" to 
them intcrnnll>· nnd (2) a cnp,ule. tnblet. or pill contnining an 
cffrcti,·c nmount of gri,eofuh·in. 
"Specific,ilh· at i,,ue in thr pre,ent litigatiou ici U. S. Pntent 
~o. 3.330.727, i~cued .Jul>· 11 . 1967. This putent CO\'ers the impro,·ed 
(fine!>· ground or "micro:,ize'') docagc form of grisrofuh·in. This 
form hn" pro\'en more effrcti\'e nnd more m:uketablc thnn other 
dosage form~ of the drug. 
71-666-0PIXIOX 
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Schering Corporation (Schering) and Johnson & John-
son (J & J). The agreements contained a covenant on 
the part of the licensees "not to sell or to permit its 
Affiliates to sell any griseofulvin in bulk to any in-
dependent third party ,Yithout Glaxo's express consent 
in ,Hiting." 3 
On March 4. 1968. the United States filed a civil 
antitrust suit against ICI and Glaxo, pursuant to § 4 of 
the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 4, to restrain alleged 
violations of § 1 of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1. The Gov-
ernment charged that the restrictions on the sale and 
resale of bulk-form griseofulvin. contained in the 1960 
ICI-Glaxo agreement and the various sublicensing agree-
ments. were unreasonable restraints of trade. The 
Government also challenged the validity of ICI's dosage-
form patent.• 
The District Court. citing this Court's decision in 
United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U. S. 365-
(1967). held that the bulk-sales restrictions contained in 
the ICI-AMHO agreement \Yere per se violations of § 1 
of the Sherman Act." 302 F. Supp. 1 (DC 1969) . 
Because ICI had filed an affidavit disclaiming any desire 
3 Although AI-I:\10. Schcring . and .T & J could ha1·e manufa ctured 
bulk-form grif:eofnh·in under GJ:-ixo's pntcnt~, in prnctice they pur-
chased the bulk fo rm of the drug from ICI and G111xo and themsch·es 
performed the procc,:scs to conYert the drug to dosage form. 
4 Sec n. 1. The Go,·crnmcnt contendrd t hnt the "method" portion 
of the patent die! not disclo~c hmY to pr;icticc the im·ention in that 
it foiled to spec if>· what is ;in "rffrrtiYe amount" of the drug. See 
35 U . S. C. § 112. The Go,-crnment :11,o nrguccl that TCI's product 
claims ,,·ere im·:1 1id brcnu,:c the do~ngc form which the>· coYcred 
did not spec if>· nu "effccti,·e nmount" of the drug. did not specif>· 
the di ,:ense,: 1Yhirh could be cured, and clnimed n patent monopoly 
on·r a sub~tnnc-P long in the publir doma in. Sec 35 U. 8. C. §§ 100 
and 101. 
·• The rase was decided on the basis of ,-n rious motions concerning 
the meri ts :md the relief. Tc.otimom· w:1s not rerciYcd ; the facts 
were de1·eloped in affidnYits , exhibit s, and interrogatories accom--
p:rnying the motions . 
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to rely on its patent in defense of the antitrust claims 
the District Court struck the claims of patent invalidity 
from the Government 's complaint. ruling that the Gov-
ernment could not challenge ICI's patent when it \Vas 
not relied upon as a defense to the antitrust claims. The 
District Court also denied the Government's motion to 
amend its complaint to allege the invalidity of Glaxo's 
patent on "microsize" griseofulvin.(; 
Subsequently, in separate. unreported orders, the bulk-
sales restrictions in the Glaxo-J & J , the Glaxo-Schering, 
and the Glaxo-ICI agreements were found to be per se 
violations of § 1. The Court enjoined future use of the 
bulk-sales restrictions. but refused the Government's re-
quest to order mandatory. nondiscriminatory sales of the 
bulk form of the drug and reasonable-royalty licensing 
of the ICI and Glaxo patents as part of the relief. The 
United States took a direct appeal under the Expediting 
Act and we noted probable jurisdiction. 405 U. S. 914. 
II 
The major issue before us is whether the District Court 
erred in ruling that the United States could challenge 
the validity of a patent in the course of prosecuting an 
antitrust action only when the patent is relied on as a 
defense, which was not the case here.7 We agree with 
the United States that this was an unduly narrow view 
of the controlling cases. 
"See n. 2. The Government had sought to challenge the patent 
on the basis that t he patent purported to monopolize a product 
long in the public domain , on the basis of prior disclosure, and on 
t he basis of prior public use. See 35 U . S. C. §§ 100, 101 , 102 (a), 
102 (b) . 
7 The Dist ri ct Court erred in st riking the allegations of t he Gov-
ernment 's complaint dealing wit h t he patent validity issue :rnd in 
refusing to permit t he GoYernment to amend its complaint with 
respect to this issue. On remand, the District Court should consider 
t he va lidity of t he I CI dosage-form patent and the Glaxo microsize 
patent. 
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United States v. B ell Telephone Co., 167 U. S. 224 
(1897) , acknowledged prior decisions permitting the 
United States to sue to set aside a patent for fraud or 
deceit asrnciatecl with its issuance, but held that the 
federal courts should not entertain suits by the Govern-
ment "to set aside a patent for an invention on the mere 
ground of error in judgment on the part of the patent 
officials," at least where the United States "has no 
proprietary or pecuniary [interest] in the setting aside of 
the patent; is not seeking to discharge its obligations 
to the public .... " 167 U. S., at 265. Subsequently, 
United States v . Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364 (1948), re-
ferred to Bell Telephone as holding that the United 
States was "without standing to bring a suit in equity to 
cancel a patent on the ground of invalidity," but went 
on to declare that, to vindicate the public interest in 
enjoining violations of the Sherman Act, the United 
States is entitled to attack the validity of patents relied 
upon to justify anticompetitive conduct otherwise vio-
lative of the law. The Court noted that, because of 
the public interest in free competition, it had repeatedly 
held that the private licensee-plaintiff in an antitrust 
suit may attack the validity of the patent under which 
he is licensed even though he has agreed not to do so 
in his license. The authorities for this proposition were 
Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U. S. 173 
(1942); Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Mfg. Co., 329 U. S. 
394 (1947); and MacGregor v. W estinghouse Co., 329 
U. S. 402 (1947). The essence of those cases is best 
revealed in Katzinger where the Court held that although 
a patent licensee ( under the then controlling law) was 
normally foreclosed from questioning the validity of a 
patent he is privileged to use, the bar is removed when 
he alleges conduct by the patentee that would be invalid 
under the antitrust laws, absent the patent. The licensee 
was free to challenge the patent in these circumstances 
because "the federal courts must, in the public interest, 
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keep the way open for the challenge of patents ,vhich 
are utilized for price fixing .... " Katzinger and Gypsum, 
,rnre much in the tradition of Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 
144 U. S. 224, 234 (1892): "It is as important to the 
public that competition should not be repressed by worth-
less patents, as that the patentee of a really valuable 
invention should be protected in his monopoly ... ," a 
view most recently echoed in Lear v. Adkins, 359 U. S. 
653, 670 (1969). 
,ve think that the principle of these cases is sufficient 
authority for permitting the Government to raise and 
litigate the validity of the ICI-Glaxo patents in this anti-
trust case. According to the allegations of the complaint, 
appellees had issued licenses under their patents that 
unreasonably restrained trade by prohibiting the licensee 
from selling or reselling patented bulk-form griseofulvin 
and had included in the pooling agreement a covenant 
to impose such restrictions on licensees. These charges 
were sustained, the court concluding that the covenant 
and the patent license provisions were per se restraints 
of trade in the griseofulvin product market. 
The District Court was then faced with the Govern-
ment's atack on the pertinent patents as well as its 
demand for mandatory sales and reasonable royalty 
licensing, the latter being ,rnll established forms of relief 
,Yhen necessary to an effective remedy, particularly where 
patents have provided the leverage for or have con-
tributed to the antitrust violation adjudicated. See for 
example, Besser Mfg. Co. v. United States, 343 U. S. 
444 (1952); United States v. United States Gypsum Co ., 
340 U. S. 76 (1950); International Salt Co. v. United 
States, 332 U. S. 392 (1947); Hartford Empire Co. v. 
United States, 323 U. S. 386 (1943). Appellees op-
posed mandatory sales and compulsory licensing. assert-
ing that the Government ,rnuld "deny defendants an 
essential ingredient of their rights under the patent 
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system." and that there ,vas no warrant for "such a drastic 
forfeiture of their rights." In this context, where the 
court would necessarily be dealing ,vith the future en-
forceability of the patents we think it would have been 
appropriate. if it appeared that the Government's claims 
for further relief were substantial, for the court to have 
eHtertained also the Government's challenge to the 
validity of those patents. 
In arriving at this conclusion, we do not recognize 
unlimited authority in the Government to attack a patent 
by basing an antitrust claim on the simple assertion 
that the patent is invalid. Cf. ·w allace Process Equip-
rnent v. Machinery & Cheniical Corp., 382 U. S. 172 
(1965). Kor do we invest the Attorney General with 
a roving commission to question the validity of any 
patent lurking in the background of an antitrust case. 
But the district courts ha.ve jurisdiction to entertain and 
decide antitrust suits brought by the Government and, 
where a violation is found , to fashion effective relief. 
This often involves a susbtantial question as to whether 
it is neecssary to limit the bundle of rights normally 
vested in the owner of a patent, which in itself can be 
a complex and difficult issue. The litigation would 
usually proceed on the assumption that valid patents are 
involved, but if this basic assumption is itself challenged, 
we perceive no good reason, either in terms of the patent 
system or of judicial administration, for refusing to hear 
and decide it. 7JL. 
The question remains whether the Government's case 
for additional relief was sufficient to provide the appro-
priate predicate for a consideration of its challenge to 
the validity of these patents. For this purpose, as we 
have said, its case need not be conclusive but only sub-
stantial enough to warrant the court undertaking ,vhat 
could be a large inquiry. but one which could easily 
obviate other questions of remedy if the patent is found 
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invalid and which, if the patent is not invalidated, would 
lend substance to a defendant's claim that a valid patent 
should not be limited absent the necessity to provide 
effective relief for 3,11 antitrust violation to which the 
patent has contributed. Here, we think not only that 
the United States presented a substantial case for addi-
tional relief but we are of the view that it was sufficiently 
convincing that the District Court, wholly aside from 
the question of patent validity, should have ruled favor-
ably on the demand for mandatory sales and compulsory 
licensing. 
~ 
In the first place, it is clea.r from the evidence that 
the ICI dosage-form patent, along with other ICI and 
Glaxo patents gave the appellees the economic leverage 
with which to insist upon and enforce the bulk-sales 
restrictions imposed on the licensees.8 Glaxo apparently 
8 The Government argued in the District Court: 
"'Ye submit that [United States v.] Gypsum [33,'3 U. S. 86-l (19-!8) J 
should be understood more broadly to support challenge to any 
patent used by antitrust defendants in furtherance of their illegal 
program. The importance of the Imperial patent to the defendants' 
scheme to violate the antitrust laws is plain. It was, according to 
ICI's contentions, the reason for the patent pool agreement in the 
first place; Glaxo's grant of rights to ICI was paid for with the 
Imperial patent. Without the Imperial patent the defendants could 
not maintain their monopoly in the United States over the drug, 
for then anyone who could secure bulk from griseofulvin could 
make it up into pills and sell them without a patent to stop him; 
bulk from griseofulvin is, as ICI points out, unpatented. The 
Imperial patent thus bolsters the effectiveness of the illegal restraint 
on alienation ICI imposes on the resale of bulk form griseofulvin; 
if a sma.!l drug company somehow manages to get the unpatented 
bulk form drug despite ICI 's restraint on alienation designed to 
prevent it or anyone else from doing so, the defendants may still 
suppress the manufacture of the drug by threat of patent infringe-
ment suit. In this context, vindication of the public intcre~t in 
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considered the bulk-sales restriction to be a prerequisite-
to the granting of a sublicense, for it rejected a draft 
of the ICI-AMHO agreement because, among other 
things, it would have permitted AMHO to sell griseo-
fulvin in bulk form. There are indications also that 
Glaxo refused a sublicense to others than Schering and 
J & J because of fears that the companies would sell 
in bulk form or pressure Glaxo to allow such sales. The 
source of the patent pooling agreement pursuant to which 
such licenses were permitted and which contained the 
bulk-sales restriction was simple: Glaxo needed the 
ICI dosage-form patent to assure its licenses the right 
to use the patent and sell in dosage form. Pooling per-
mitted ICI to engage in bulk manufacture, and, in ex-
change, ICI imposed the bulk-sales restrictions upon its 
licensees. There can be little question that the patents 
involved here were intimately associated with and con-
tributed to effectuating the conduct that the District 
Court held to be a per se restraint of trade in griseofulvin. 
Secondly, we think that ICI and Glaxo should have 
been required to sell bulk-form griseofulvin on reason-
able and nondiscriminatory terms and to grant patent 
licenses at reasonable royalty rates to all bona fide appli-
cants in order to "pry open to competition" the griseo-
fulvin market which "has been closed by defendant's 
competitjon in unpatentable goods is doubly important-for there 
is a double impediment to commerce-the patent and the conspir[lcy." 
The Government, throughout its brief in this Court, emphasizes the 
importance of the patents to the antitrust violation. 
" In cases like this, the patents involved generally are of major 
importance in furthering the allegedly unlawful patent licensing 
practices; they give the defendants the power which enables them 
to impose the restraint of trade. This is the situation here. The 
patents were essent ial to the appellees' scheme to violate the antitrust 
laws." 
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illegal restraints." International Salt Co., supra, 332 
U. S., at 401. 
The United States griseofulvin market consists of three 
wholesalers, all licensees of appellees, that account for 
100% of United States sales totaling approximately eight 
million dollars. Glaxo and ICI have never sold in bulk 
to others than the licensees and ha.ve prohibited 
bulk sales and resales by the licensees. In practice, the 
licensees have not manufactured griseofulvin under the 
bulk-form patents. preferring instead to purchase in bulk 
form from ICI and Glaxo. The licensees sell the drug 
in dosage and microsize form to retail outlets at virtually 
identical prices. The effect of appellees' refusal to sell 
in bulk and prohibition on such sales by the licensees 
has been that bulk griseofulvin has not been available 
to any but appellees' three licensees and that these three 
are the only sources of dosage-form griseofulvin in the 
United States. 
There is little reason to think that the appellees or 
their licensees, now that the bulk sales restrictions have 
been declared illegal, will begin selling in bulk. It is in 
their economic self-interest to maintain control of the 
bulk form of the drug in order to keep the dosage-form, 
wholesale market competition-free. Bulk sales would 
create new competition among wholesalers, by enabling 
other companies to convert the bulk drug into dosage 
and microsize forms and sell to retail outlets. and would 
presumably lead to price reductions as the result of 
normal competitive forces. There is, in fact, substantial 
evidence in the record to the effect that other drug com-
panies would not only have entered the market, had 
they been able to make bulk purchases, but also would 
have charged substantially lower wholesale prices for 
the dosage and microsize forms of the drug. Only by 
requiring the appellees to sell bulk-form griseofulvin on 
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nondiscriminatory terms to all bona fide applicants will 
the dosage-form, wholesale market become competitive. 
Relief in the form of compulsory sales may not, how-
ever, alone insure a competitive market. Glaxo and 
ICI could choose to discontinue bulk-form manufactur-
ing or the sale of griseofulvin in bulk form. The patent 
licensees might then begin to practice the bulk-form 
manufacturing patents pursuant to the patent licenses 
to fill their needs for the bulk drug. The licensees, of 
course, a.re not parties to this action, and a. mandatory-
sales order would not affect them. They would not be 
required to make the economically less advantageous 
bulk sales. The bulk form of the drug would be con-
trolled by the licensees, and the appellees, because they 
would be required under the Government's proposed 
relief to sell to all applicants only so long as they se11 
to any United States purchasers, could easily avoid the 
mandatory-sales requirement. Unless other American 
firms are licensed to manufacture griseofulvin, competi-
tion in the United States market ,vill depend entirely 
upon appellees' willingness to continue to supply their 
present licensees with the bulk form of the drug. 
This Court has repeatedly recognized that " [ t] he fram-
ing of decrees should take place in the district rather than 
in appellate courts" and has generally followed the prin-
ciple that district courts "are invested with large discre-
tion to model their judgments to fit the exigencies of 
the particular case." International Salt Co. v. United 
States, supra, 332 U. S., at 400-401; accord, Ford Motor 
Co. v. United Slates, 405 U. S. 562, 573. The Court has 
not, hmvever, treated that po,rnr as one of discretion, 
subject only to reversal for gross abuse, but has recog-
nized "an obligation to intervene in this most significant 
phase of the case" when necessary to assure that the 
relief will be effective. United States v. United States 
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Gypsum Co., supra, 340 U. S., at 89. Accordingly, we 
have ordered affirmative relief which the District Court 
has refused to implement. See, e. g., United States v. 
United States Gypsum, supra. The purpose of relief in 
an antitrust case is "so far as practicable, [to] cure the 
ill effects of the illegal conduct, and assure the public 
freedom from its continuance." United States v. United 
States Gypsum Co., supra, 340 U. S., at 88. Mandatory 
selling on specified terms and compulsory patent licens-
ing at reasonable charges are recognized antitrust reme-
dies. See, e. g., Besser Mfg. Co. v. United States, 343 
U.S. 444 (1952); International Salt Co. v. United States, 
332 U. S. 392 (1947); Hartford Empire Co. v. United 
States, 323 U. S. 386 (1943). The District Court 
should have ordered those remedies in this case. 
~ 
